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ABSTRACT
The 1996 Farm Act and the 1994 Crop Insurance Reform Act are recent examples of
policy changes thathave increased risks for U.S. farmers. New products are emerging to
help farmers manage risks. This article examines some of the policy changes, farmer
responses, and new risk-sharing products. The focus turnsto the new revenue insurance
products and their potential in the South, While there are reasons to believe revenue
insurance should be attractivein the South, any revenue products thatuse existing crop
insurance rates will face difficulties since poor actuarial performance in the South has
resultedin relatively high rates.
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Significant changes have occurred in U.S.
farm policies. The most recent changes are
embedded in the 1996 Farm Act. The 1996 act
altered the government’s role in providing
support to producers, and has renewed interest
in agricultural risks and alternative ways to
mitigate those risks. While farmers have many
choices for managing risk, new alternatives
have emerged. The U.S. Department of Agri-
culture’s (USDA’s) Risk Management Agency
and its private insurance partners have added
several choices just since 1993. These new
risk-sharing products have prompted much in-
terest and many questions, particularly ques-
tions about the new revenue insurance
programs. This article explores producer in-
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terest in and the potential for alternative strat-
egies, with a focus on the South and the new
revenue products. 1We begin with a review of
some recent policy changes and the choices
now available to farmers. Next we examine
the potential effectiveness of these alternatives
for the South in reducing income risk, using
participation and premium rate data, and re-
search on the effectiveness of various risk-
management tools.
Each revenue insurance program has spe-
cial nuances, and each has aspects that relate
to the Federal Multiple Peril Crop Insurance
(MPCI ) program. Thus, it is important to un-
derstand the history of poor MPCI actuarial
performance in the South and the resultant in-
creases in premium rates, Since the crop rev-
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ante uses existing crop insurance premium
rates, fixing problems with the existing crop
insurance program in the South is critical to
the success of CRC in the South. While three
basic revenue products are now available,
there are other types of products that have
been, and will be, considered. We conclude by
discussing some of the alternatives.
Federal Policy Changes in the FAIR Act
The 1996 Farm Act dismantled the complex
system of deficiency payments and annual sup-
ply management programs that were in place
since 1973, affecting expected returns and the
income variability y confronted by grain produc-
ers. Because deficiency payments were made
when national average prices for program crops
were low, income variability was, in certain lo-
cations, reduced significantly (Glauber and
Miranda). These payments were most effective
when year-to-year market incomes fluctuated
greatly (e.g., where the price-yield correlation
is weak), and deficiency payments served to
even out and minimize the effects of variability.
In locations with a strong natural hedge (e.g.,
areas with a strongly negative price-yield cor-
relation that served to inherently stabilize rev-
enues), year-to-year revenue variability was not
dampened significantly for certain individual
farms, and not at all in other cases (Glauber
and Miranda).
In contrast to the deficiency payment sys-
tem, participating farmers under the 1996
Farm Act receive contract payments that are
fixed in the aggregate for each of the years
1996–2002. Although contract payments are
sizeable, they do not vary inversely with mar-
ket prices, and thus they do not directly affect
producers’ income risk in any location. These
payments result in significant income enhance-
ment, particularly in the early years of the act,
but taper off in the final years. The outlook
for payments beyond 2002 is uncertain. Most
analysts believe that payment continuation (in
some form) will largely depend on the market
outlook in the early part of the next century.
Without deficiency payments to compen-
sate for commodity price variability, farmers’
revenues should be more risky. This new
source of risk for crop growers may be com-
pounded by the new freedom to plant any crop
based on price expectations. Since producers
also have greater flexibility in switching crops
from year to year, price variability may in-
crease. The question about whether the new
policies will result in greater or lower price
variability is hotly debated among economists
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) 1997a, b]. Understand-
ing price variability is a critical issue in rating
revenue insurance products.
Strategies Have Changed with Farm
Policy
There is much interest about how farmers are
adapting to the new risk environment created
by the 1996 Farm Act, and their use of alter-
native risk-management tools. For example, in
the most recent (as of February 1998) Agri-
culture and Resource Management Study
(ARMS), the U.S. Department of Agriculture
asked producers whether or not they had in-
creased their use of various strategies (or were
considering adopting use of those strategies)
because of changes in the 1996 Farm Act.
Four strategies were among the options listed
for producers: (a) diversification, (b) forward
contracting, (c) hedging, and (d) keeping a
line of credit open.
At the U.S. level, the results are fairly mod-
est. As figure 1 reveals, fewer than 5% of U.S.
farmers indicated that they increased their use
of any of the four strategies in 1996 in re-
sponse to changes in the 1996 act. For each
category, an additional 1–2% responded that
they had not used the strategy, but were con-
sidering adopting it in the future. Responses
were fairly consistent across regions.
These results suggest that some farmers
(albeit a small percentage) are aware of the
need for new strategies and ways of managing
risk. This awareness is due not only to the
1996 Farm Act, but has also developed in light
of greater trade liberalization, an increasingly
integrated world economy, and other changes
in the world marketplace. Because the new
revenue insurance products were first intro-
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Figure 1. Percentage of respondents changing risk-management strategies due to farm bill
changes
not yet included any questions regarding farm-
ers’ interest in these new tools. However, pro-




An understanding of changes in government
policy—particularly regarding crop insur-
ance—is an important context for understand-
ing the pressures for, and the resulting forms
of, alternative revenue insurance and other
risk-management products. While the govern-
ment has attempted to reduce its role in pro-
viding price and income support, there has
been a continual and increasing emphasis on
agricultural insurance, starting with the 1980
Crop Insurance Act. Although subsidized crop
insurance was available from 1981 to 1994,
low participation, poor actuarial performance,
and the existence of ad hoc disaster assistance
(for which U.S. crop growers received over
$12 billion) resulted in pressure for reform.
The Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of
1994 addressed this dual system of federal
crop insurance and ad hoc disaster assistance
by forcing any future spending on emergency
ad hoc crop disaster payments into the federal
budget. Future emergency crop disaster pay-
ments will increase the federal budget deficit
unless offset by tax increases or spending cuts
elsewhere. This discipline makes it less likely
that Congress will pass disaster aid bills in the
future. Again, just as the FAIR Act forces
growers to consider price risk management,
the 1994 Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act
forces growers to consider ex post alternative
methods (such as MPCI ) for protection
against natural disasters.
Changes in Crop Insurance
As part of the 1994 Federal Crop Insurance
Reform Act, Congress introduced catastrophic
(CAT) crop insurance coverage. Growers pay
no premium for CAT coverage. Rather, they
must pay an administrative fee of $50 per
crop, with a limit of $200 per farm per county.
CAT policies essentially offer free disaster as-
sistance, providing a low-level safety net for
producers. The major difference between CAT
and ad hoc assistance is that, in the former
case, the grower must pay an administrative
fee and provide evidence as to his or her yield
potential and the acreage planted to the crop.50 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
Such requirements should reduce the type of
fraud that occurred with the ad hoc payments
of recent years (U.S. General Accounting Of-
fice). CAT policies pay for losses below 50%
of the grower’s historical average yield, with
payments made at a rate of 60% of the price
election offered by the Risk Management
Agency. In the first year, Congress required
that any farmer receiving selected government
subsidies (including deficiency payments, cer-
tain Farm Service Agency loans, and new
Conservation Reserve Program contracts) ob-
tain coverage at the CAT level or higher. This
concept of linkage was eliminated, however,
in the 1996 FAIR Act. Now, producers can
choose in each year whether or not they will
obtain coverage, independent of their partici-
pation in other USDA programs.
When crop insurance is not available for a
specific crop, growers are eligible for the Non-
insured Assistance Program (NAP). This pro-
gram allows farmers in areas experiencing nat-
ural disasters to receive payments if both the
area (typically defined as a county) and the
individual producer suffer losses. Farmers
must sign up for NAP before they plant the
crop (Lee, Harwood, and Somwaru). Recently,
Secretary Glickman has emphasized that all
NAP policies should be converted to CAT pol-
icies by the year 2000, which will require a
sizeable expansion in the number of insured
crops. The individual-level triggers for CAT
and NAP are identical. The advantage of CAT,
however, is that it is based only on individual-
level losses; the area need not have a loss be-
fore farmers can collect payments.
In addition to legislative changes, signifi-
cant administrative changes have been made
to the basic crop insurance program, starting
in the mid- 1980s. Individualized coverage was
introduced in the mid- 1980s. Growers can
now prove their yields with certifiable records
and receive coverage based on the simple av-
erage of 4– 10 years of these historical records.
This 4–10 year average is referred to as the
producer’s actual production history (or APH)
yield, and forms the backbone of the multi-
peril crop insurance program. APH insurance
is available for farm units, meaning that a
grower with several farms in the same county
can insure different APH yields (and thus lev-
els of the guarantee) on each unit. Those farm-
ers who do not have four years of records are
assigned a discounted APH yield, typically
based either on their program yield or on the
county average yield.
Growers can select among a wide variety
of coverage levels under the crop insurance
program. More specifically, a grower can ob-
tain APH crop insurance at levels between
50% and 75% of his or her APH yield, using
5$% increments. The grower also can select a
price level between 60% and 100% of the es-
tablished price set by USDA’s Risk Manage-
ment Agency. The basic CAT level of cover-
age is 50/60 (with the first number referring
to the yield coverage level, and the second
number referring to the price coverage). Cov-
erage above the CAT level, up to a maximum
of 75/100, is termed “buy-up” coverage.
As an example, consider a corn grower
with an APH yield of 125 bushels per acre
who selects the 65~0 coverage level and the
maximum price election of $2.45 in a given
year. In this example, the liability is 125 bush-
els per acre X 0.65 X $2.45 per bushel = $199
per acre. If the grower’s yield is zero, his or
her indemnity payment would total $199. Be-
fore the 1994 Federal Crop Insurance Reform
Act, growers received a premium subsidy of
30% for policies up to the 65/100% coverage
level. Now, growers receive a premium sub-
sidy of 41.770 at the 65/100 level of coverage,
with the subsidy percentage varying according
to the exact level of coverage chosen by the
producer. Administrative costs are reimbursed
for the private companies selling federal crop
insurance, currently at a rate of 27% of total
premium.
Group Risk Plan Insurance
The introduction of revenue insurance in 1996
is not the government’s first effort at offering
a new alternative insurance to the APH pro-
gram. The “Group Risk Plan” crop insurance
program, introduced in 1993, was the first at-
tempt at diversifying the portfolio of subsi-
dized agricultural insurance available to pro-
ducers. The Group Risk Plan (GRP) usesSkees et al.: Revenue Insurance in the South 51
USDA estimates of county average yields as
the basis of payment. Payments are based on
the liability a farmer selects, multiplied by the
percentage by which the county average yield
(as reported by the USDA) falls below the
trigger yield selected. Trigger yields can be
70%, 75%, 80%, 85%, or 9090 of the expected
county yield. GRP expected yields were the
first USDA yields used within agricultural in-
surance that- are adjusted for trends in tech-
nology.
The GRP was designed to address some of
the traditional problems of adverse selection
and moral hazard associated with individual-
ized (APH) crop insurance. Because it is based
only on county average yields, GRP insurance
has distinct features that producers should un-
derstand before they decide upon coverage.
For example, farmers can have a loss and not
be paid if their own yield is low, but the coun-
ty yield does not fall below the critical level
required for payment. GRP policies are con-
sidered “buy-up” policies, and are subsidized
in a similar fashion to APH policies. A farm’s
yield must be correlated with the county’s
yield for GRP insurance to provide adequate
risk protection to the producer (Miranda;
Skees, Black, and Barnett).
Revenue Insurance in the United States
Along with changes in the federal crop insur-
ance program, Congress and the Administra-
tion set the stage for revenue insurance in the
United States in the early 1980s. In the 1981
Farm Act, for example, Congress mandated a
study on the feasibility of revenue insurance.
The final report, which was delivered in 1983,
raised many questions about adverse selection
and moral hazard. In nearly every act since
1981, the Congress mentioned revenue insur-
ance. In both the 1994 Federal Crop Insurance
Reform Act and the 1996 FAIR Act, Congress
provided clear signals to the USDA Risk Man-
agement Agency about pilot testing revenue
insurance.
Over the past two decades, numerous stud-
ies have examined various aspects of revenue
insurance (Babcock and Henness y; Heifner;
Heifner and Coble). Meanwhile, the Canadi-
ans introduced two forms of revenue protec-
tion, the Gross Revenue Insurance Program
(GRIP) and the Net Income Stabilization Ac-
count (NISA) program (see below). Also, pri-
or to the 1995 Farm Bill debate, the Iowa
Farm Bill Task Force recommended the intro-
duction of a “revenue assurance” program.
Congress has also expressed a desire for in-
surance based on costs of production, but eval-
uations have indicated that such a program
would be fraught with implementation prob-
lems. Specifically, costs of production vary
widely across farmers in the same region who
produce the same crops or livestock, depend-
ing on many factors including the practice
type (irrigated versus nonirrigated crops) and
land ownership type (owned versus rented).
Three revenue insurance products currently
are available to producers in selected areas.
These products complement many strategies,
such as the use of diversification, and provide
a more comprehensive alternative to using
multi-peril crop insurance. In examining rev-
enue insurance alternatives, policy makers,
program officials, and private insurance com-
panies in the United States have benefited
greatly from witnessing Canada’s experience.
Specifically, Canada’s GRIP program (first in-
troduced in 1991) was quite costly and inter-
fered with market signals, largely because it
used long-term average prices in establishing
the guarantee. Based on observing the Cana-
dian experience, all U.S. revenue insurance
products use an intra-year, futures-based price
in establishing the guarantee, rather than a
long-term average price.z
2The CanadianGRIP program paid indemnities
basedon a 15-yearmoving averageof crop revenue.
The guaranteewas set on a crop-specific basis. For
example,if the 15-yearmoving averageincome (price
timesyield) were$300 peracreandtheguarantee was
basedon 70% of averagerevenue,the grower would
be indemnifiedanytimerevenuedroppedbelow $210,
so as to make the revenueequal to $210. GRIP ran
into earlyproblems,as the guaranteewas basedon a
long-runguaranteethatreflectedhigherprices in ear-
lier years. Because internationalcommodity prices
were low when GRIP was introduced,the revenue
guaranteewas too high to sustain.The programwas
more of an income-enhancement programthananin-
suranceprogram.This pointsto a significantproblem
in providingguarantees for longer-termincomes.52 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
U.S. revenue insurance products were first
introduced in 1996. In that year, the income
protection (1P) product was developed by
USDA’s Risk Management Agency in re-
sponse to language in the Federal Crop Insur-
ance Reform Act of 1994. Crop revenue cov-
erage (CRC), also introduced in 1996, was
designed by Redland Insurance, a private com-
pany. These programs were expanded from
limited coverage in 1996 to new geographic
areas in 1997. A new product—revenue as-
surance (RA)—was also offered in 1997 for
corn and soybeans in Iowa.3
While these three plans have many similar
features, they also, in many ways, are unique.
All of the products are based on the concept
of combining price and yield risk protection
in one program that provides downside reve-
nue risk protection to producers. They are also
similar in their use of the terms associated
with basic coverage under APH insurance.
Each product requires producers to pay a pre-
mium for coverage. Premiums are subsidized
by the federal government in a manner similar
to the APH program. The government also re-
insures companies against a portion of the
losses associated with each product. The
uniqueness of each product, as described be-
low, is found in the specification of the guar-
antee, the rating methodology, and the pro-
ducer’s ability to subdivide acreage into
individual parcels.
The Income Protection (1P) Plan
Income protection offers a “revenue guman-
tee” that protects producers against low
yields, low prices, or a combination of both.
The level of the guarantee is unique to each
producer, and is based on sign-up time future
prices for harvest-time delivery, the farmer’s
expected yield, and the coverage level chosen
by the farmer (ranging from 50–75%). The
farmer must insure all of his/her acreage in the
crop in the county as a single parcel, termed
an “enterprise unit.” The farmer receives an
3Since RA is not availablein the South,it is not
discussedin this article. RA is more similar to 1Pthan
to CRC.
indemnity if the harvest-time price, multiplied
by the farm’s APH yield in that year, falls be-
low the guarantee. Because the guarantee is
based on the early-season price projection for
harvest time, 1P protects against shortfalls in
actual revenue below the expected revenue for
the particular season.
As an illustration, consider how IP might
work for the corn grower (with a 125-bushel
APH yield) discussed earlier in this article.
The guarantee, based on the average futures
price quote for December corn traded during
the month of February, may be quite different
than the maximum APH price election. Let’s
assume that the average February quote on the
December contract is $2.85 per bushel. If the
grower selects 70% coverage, payments are
made when the product of the harvest-time
quote on the December contract and the pro-
ducer’s actual yield in the given year are less
than 7090 of 125 X $2.85, or $249 per acre.
Thus, if the November average quote for the
December futures contract is $2, and the
grower has a yield of 120 bushels per acre, a
payment of $9 per acre would be made ($249
– $240).
In the above illustration, prices are rela-
tively low and yields are at near-normal levels.
Conversely, harvest-time prices could be high,
and low yields could trigger a payment. For
example, assume the producer’s actual yield is
70 bushels per acre and the harvest-time future
quote is $3 per bushel. The farmer’s actual
revenue is $210 per acre, and a payment of
$39 would be forthcoming ($249 – $210).
While CRC availability has spanned broad
geographic areas, 1P availability typically has
been limited to a small number of counties in
any given state. In 1997, for example, 1P was
limited to 14 corn and soybean counties in 11-
linois, Indiana, and Iowa; eight spring wheat
counties throughout Minnesota and North Da-
kota; and 18 winter wheat counties in Kansas,
Montana, and Washington. In the South, 1P
coverage was available in 42 Arkansas soy-
bean counties, four Alabama cotton counties,
four Georgia cotton counties, and 25 Texas
grain sorghum counties.
The 1P premium rating methodology re-
flects historical yield variation and variationsSkees et al.: Revenue Insurance in the South 53
in gross income due to yield and price move-
ments during the growing season. More spe-
cifically, the rating model includes the corre-
lation of national prices and county yields, the
relationship between APH yields and the
county average yield in that year, and the
year’s projected price level. Consequently,
premium rates vary across counties and
among producers within a given county. The
dollar value of the 1P premium subsidy (paid
by the government) is about equal to that for
APH coverage.
As with APH, the producer-paid premium
equals the premium rate multiplied by the li-
ability, less the premium subsidy. In general,
1P premiums in the South, using soybeans as
an example, range from 5% to nearly 1O% of
the producer’s liability. This is considerably
higher than 1P rates for soybeans in the Corn
Belt, which are in the 2–4% range. This dif-
ferential reflects greater yield variability for
soybeans in the South, as well as the weaker
price-yield correlation in that region.
Overall, premiums tend to be lower for 1P
than for traditional APH crop insurance. This
is because prices and yields are negatively cor-
related, reducing the likelihood of 1P pay-
ments. In addition, the longer-term weather
(reflected in the longer-term series of county
yields) used to rate 1P is less variable in some
regions than the experience used to rate APH.
When 1P rates are expressed as a proportion
of APH premium rates, the ratio resulting for
soybeans in the South is at about the same
level as in the Corn Belt, ranging from about
40?6 to 80% of the APH rate in 1997.4 The
premium rate differentials tend to vary nearly
as much within a given state as across differ-
ent states. For cotton, 1P premium rates gen-
erally tend to fall within the range of 80–85%
of APH rates.
Relative 1P and APH rates are likely an im-
portant factor explaining 1P purchases, partic-
ularly with regard to Arkansas soybeans. Of
the Arkansas soybean acreage covered by
some type of federally subsidized crop insur-
ance in 1997, about 40% was in II? This is a
4Rates are calculatedas the premiumfor buy-up
coveragedividedby liability.
very strong showing for a product in its first
year, particularly since 1P was introduced late
in the sales season. It is important to note that
the range, however, was quite diverse. In five
counties, 1P accounted for more than 6090 of
total insured acreage, while 1P accounted for
less than 5% of total insured acreage in 17 of
the 42 counties in Arkansas. These differences
might be the result of agent knowledge and
promotion of II? For certain farmers, 1P may
provide an attractive option, particularly
where APH premium rates are at relatively
high levels.
The Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) Plan
Crop revenue coverage is more complicated
than 1~ offering two coverage components to
farmers. The first component, similar to 1~ of-
fers a revenue guarantee based on spring-time
futures quotes on the harvest-time contract
and farmers’ expected yields. If the producer’s
actual revenue (based on the harvest-time fu-
tures price and the producer’s actual yield)
falls below the guarantee, he or she is eligible
for a “revenue indemnity.” The second com-
ponent offers “replacement coverage,” where-
by coverage can increase during the season if
futures price quotes rise. That is, if a farmer
has a short crop and the price is higher at har-
vest time than the preharvest projection, the
producer’s crop yield loss is indemnified at the
higher harvest-time price, allowing the pro-
ducer to buy “replacement” bushels in the
marketplace. The producer receives the higher
of the “revenue indemnity” or “replacement
coverage indemnity. ”
As an illustration, consider the corn grower
used in the 1P example above. This grower
will receive the greater of the 1Ppayment (cal-
culated as above) or a replacement payment.
Recall that, for a 70-bushel yield and a price
of $3 per bushel, the 1Ppayment would be $39
per acre. Under CRC, the crop insurance di-
mension, along with the movement in the fu-
tures price over the season, would be consid-
ered. With coverage at 7090 of the 125 APH,
payment is made for yields below 87.5 bushels
per acre. Using the harvest price of $3 per
bushel, multiplied by the 17.5 bushel shortfall,54 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
provides a replacement payment of $52.50.
Since this amount is greater than the revenue
payment, the producer receives $52.50 per
acre.
CRC geographic coverage, initially encom-
passing all counties in Iowa and Nebraska for
corn and soybeans in 1996, was expanded sig-
nificantly in 1997. In 1997, CRC was avail-
able for corn and soybeans in producing coun-
ties from Texas and Oklahoma through
Minnesota, and eastward through Ohio. Wheat
coverage was offered from Texas through
North Dakota, and in Washington and selected
counties in Montana. Cotton CRC was offered
in Arizona, Georgia, Oklahoma, and selected
counties in Texas, while grain sorghum CRC
was offered in Colorado, Nebraska, Oklaho-
ma, and certain counties in Kansas. As can be
seen from this list, CRC coverage was avail-
able in limited counties in the South, and
mainly for cotton and wheat.
CRC coverage has expanded rapidly. In
1998, CRC coverage encompassed virtually
all U.S. planted acreage in corn, soybeans,
wheat, and cotton, except in the Northeast.
Once approval for subsidies and reinsurance is
obtained from the Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation board of directors, Redland In-
surance is planning to offer CRC for rice (ten-
tatively in 1999). Moreover, the company is
investigating the insurability of canola, pea-
nuts, and citrus under CRC (Cleveland).
Premium rates are set very differently for
CRC than for 1P Unlike 1P premium rates,
CRC rates are based on the underlying APH
rate for the crop, with the CRC rate, in addi-
tion, adding a load for the price risk compo-
nent. 1P rates assume a nonzero price-yield
correlation, while the rating methodology for
CRC assumes that the correlation is zeros The
producer premium subsidy is paid only on the
yield risk portion of CRC coverage, which is
s while the assumption of zero correlation Seems
troublesome, the methods used provide some offsetting
effects thatmake it less of a problem. With low prices,
a negative price-yield correlation means lower rates
than a zero correlation. With high prices, a negative
price-yield correlation means higher rates than a zero
correlation. CRC pays under certain conditions for ei-
ther a low price or a high price.
=>1.50
Figure 2. Corn buy-up insurance premium
rates paid by farmers = CRC/APH, 1997
approximately the same dollar amount as cov-
erage under the APH policy. Thus, the pro-
portion of the CRC premium that is subsidized
is less than for 1P or APH.
CRC premium rates are always higher than
APH rates, largely because of the “replace-
ment coverage” component of the policy (fig-
ure 2). In most CRC corn and soybean coun-
ties, regardless of their location, premium rates
were 20–40% higher than APH rates. In a sig-
nificant number of corn counties in the Mid-
west, CRC premium rates were about 50%
higher than APH rates. For cotton, premium
rates tended to average up to 40% higher than
APH rates, with certain counties in Oklahoma
and Georgia experiencing the highest rates.
Despite the higher rates associated with
CRC, sales were strong relative to APH in
1997 in many areas. Indeed, little correlation
appears to exist between premium rates (rela-
tive to APH) and the portion of federally sub-
sidized acreage covered by CRC. CRC sales
were particularly strong for corn and soybeans
in Iowa and Nebraska. llvo factors likely ex-
plain this result. First, Iowa and Nebraska
were the only states having prior experience
with CRC in 1996, and producers were more
familiar with the product than in locations
where 1997 was the first year of coverage
availability. Second, Iowa and Nebraska have
a sizeable Redland Insurance (the CRC devel-
oping company) sales force, and agent enthu-
siasm was likely strong.
Cotton and wheat are the only crops where
CRC had a significant presence in the SouthSkees et al.: Revenue Insurance in the South
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Figure 3. Proportion of wheat CRC acres to
all buy-up insured wheat acres, 1997
in 1997. For cotton, CRC tended to account
for less than 30% of the federally insured crop
acreage in 1997 in most areas in Texas and
Georgia.b In three Georgia counties, CRC
acreage accounted for more than 60% of total
insured acreage. Surprisingly, in two of these
counties, premium rates were more than 6090
higher than APH rates. As explained previ-
ously, such anomalies are likely attributable to
producer exposure and agent enthusiasm in in-
troducing the product. For wheat, CRC acres
as a percentage of total insured acres were
quite variable, ranging from less than 30% in
certain counties to more than 80% in others
(figure 3).
The only overlap between CRC and 1P
availability in 1997 was in several counties in
Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa. In those counties,
1P sales were weak relative to CRC. A number
of factors could explain this. Again, agent en-
thusiasm for CRC was likely greater than for
1P as CRC was a privately developed product.
It also may be that many producers prefer the
greater flexibility in CRC coverage, which al-
lows producers to subdivide their acreage ac-
cording to section line, practice (irrigated ver-
sus nonirrigated), and crop type. With 1P,
producers must insure all of their acreage in
GParticipationis expressedas CRC insuredacres
dividedby totalinsuredacresacrossall federallysub-
sidized agricultural insurance products (including
APH, 113GRl? etc.). Counties with less than a certain
acreage level were omitted from the analysis (e.g., less




Figure 4. Proportion of corn CRC acres to
all buy-up insured corn acres, 1997
one crop as a single unit. In addition, 1P was
newly offered in many areas in 1997, and did
not have the widespread exposure that was af-
forded CRC. In many corn and soybean areas
in 1997, CRC sales accounted for a large share
of total federally insured acreage (figures 4
and 5).
Revenue Insurance Could Be Effective in
the South
Since the South does not dominate production
of many crops, there is little or no correlation
between prices and yields. Low levels of cor-
relation, as well as inherent levels of yield
variability, suggest that revenue insurance
could be more attractive in the South than in
the rest of the U.S. Recent research has ex-
amined the effectiveness of various risk-man-
agement alternatives (crop insurance, revenue
Figure 5. Proportion of soybean CRC acres
to all buy-up insured soybean acres, 199756 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
insurance, and forward contracting) in reduc-
ing revenue risk for corn producers in various
locations, including representative areas in the
South (including North Carolina). This re-
search assumes farmers pay rates that are
equal to the expected return from the various
risk-sharing alternatives. Under these condi-
tions, the probability of revenue being less
than 70$% of expected is about 23% in North
Carolina if a producer chooses to sell his/her
corn crop at harvest for the local market price.
With the use of either crop insurance or for-
ward contracting alone, the probability of a
low revenue is reduced to 1890. In addition,
with revenue insurance (or the combination of
a forward contract and crop insurance), the
probability of a low revenue is about 790 (Har-
wood et al.).
Revenue insurance (or contracting and crop
insurance) can be quite attractive in such sit-
uations in the South for two basic reasons.
First, yield variability is at relatively high lev-
els for crops such as corn and soybeans in the
Southeast, when compared to lower risk areas
in the Midwest. Second, the price-yield cor-
relation (or “natural hedge” ) is relatively
weak for North Carolina corn and for various
other crops in the South. That is, low prices
and low yields (or high prices and high yields)
are more likely to occur for corn in the South-
east than in the Corn Belt. This situation
makes revenues inherently more variable, as
these areas have less impact than does the
Corn Belt on national output and prices. In
short, stabilizing revenue variability through
programs such as revenue insurance can have
a major impact in areas where revenue is in-
herently unstable.
How Is the South Different?
While the research above suggests that reve-
nue insurance can be more effective in the
South than in many other parts of the U.S.,
keep in mind that the work was performed
with the assumption that premium rates equal
the relative risk. If the majority of farmers in
the South must pay more for the risk protec-
tion than is represented by the relative risks,
the results may not hold. This is important
since summary statistics illustrate that expe-
rience with crop insurance clearly has been
different in the South than in the rest of the
United States. One measure of performance is
the loss ratio, which is calculated as the sum
of all payouts (indemnities) divided by the
sum of total premiums (including the premium
subsidy). From 198 1–96, the loss ratio for
buy-up insurance is 1.70, and 1.14 for the rest
of the United States. While loss experience in
recent years has improved, the gap remains.
The buy-up loss ratio from 1990–96 is 1.49
for the South and 1.06 for the rest of the coun-
try. When the implicit premium subsidy as-
sociated with CAT policies is included, the
1990–96 loss ratio (both CAT and buy-up
policies) is lower, at 1.28 in the South and .98
for the rest of the United States. The lower
loss ratios in the 1990s largely have been the
result of underwriting changes and higher pre-
mium rates.’ The premium rates paid for buy-
up crop insurance have remained relatively
constant for the rest of the U.S. during the
1980s and 1990s (about 6’%0).In contrast, rates
paid in the South have increased from 6.3%
in 1981 to over 10.79ZO in 1997. At the same
time, the South’s share of total exposure in the
crop insurance program (liability) has declined
from over 40% in the early 1980s to just
above 20% in 1997 (figure 6).
Another comparison of participation in the
South versus the rest of the U.S. is with acres
insured as a proportion of acres planted. The
most striking example of this difference is
with soybeans (figure 7). In the early 1980s,
the South had nearly 20% of its soybean acres
insured, while the rest of the U.S. had just
over 10YO. By 1996, southern participation
was at 17% even though the rest of the U.S.
had 44970participation rates. During this peri-
od, the South’s share of U.S. soybean acreage
went from nearly 50% to under 3070. While
many factors explain the decline in southern
soybean acreage, is it possible that one factor
is the difference in the relative benefits of the
7Rates are the total premium paid divided by the
coverage or liability in force during the period. They
are converted to dollars of premium paid per $100 of
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Figure 6. Southern crop insurance experience: Rate increases vs. declines in share of insur-
ance, 1976–97
Figure 7. Soybean participation (net acres insured/planted acres) for the South vs. rest
U.S., 1976–96
of
crop insurance program in the South versus
the rest of the U.S.?
Corn participation in the South and the rest
of the U.S. was roughly 107o in the early
1980s; by 1996, participation in the South was
only 24% versus 4790 for the rest of the U.S.
(figure 8). Again, the South’s share of acreage
declined significantly during this period. Sor-
ghum has exhibited a different pattern, since
both the South and the rest of the U.S. have
had similar participation throughout the last
couple of decades, moving from approximate-
ly 10% in each region to 45% by 1996. The
South’s share of sorghum acres also has re-
mained relatively constant at nearly 5070
throughout the period. Wheat participation in
the South always has been lower than that of
the rest of the U.S. The 1996 rates are 24% in
the South versus 48% in the rest of the U.S.
The South’s share of wheat acreage has re-
mained at around 3090.
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Figure8. Cornparticipation(netacresinsured/planted acres) for the South vs. restof
1976–96
urns associated with CATpolicies provides an-
other indication of differences in the South. In
the South, 28?Z0of the 1997 premium was as-
sociated with CAT policies. In the rest of the
U.S., 15% of the total premium was accounted
for by CAT. Similarly, over one-half of all in-
sured acres in the South are in CAT, while less
than one-third of the acres insured in the rest
of the United States are CAT policies.
Major problems with actuarial performance
are equally concentrated in a few state-crop
combinations, Texas is by far the dominant
state in an examination of excess losses (in-
demnities minus total premium). Of the $2.9
billion dollars of excess loss incurred from
198 1–96, Texas accounted for $827 million, or
nearly one-third of the total. Texas cotton has
been a continual challenge, with $477 million
in excess losses. Seven of the top 11 states for
excess losses were in the South over this pe-
riod. Georgia accounted for $285 million and
Louisiana had $172 million in excess losses.
Peanuts in Georgia accounted for $221 million
in excess losses. Excess losses for tobacco in
North Carolina totaled $129 million. Soybeans
in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas each
accounted for over $100 million, and Texas
wheat was also over $100 million.
A major problem in the 1980s was south-
ern soybeans. In Louisiana, Arkansas, and
Us.,
Mississippi, crop insurance payments were
made on well over half of the acres insured.
This is a very disturbing statistic. Since the
maximum protection available is 7570 of the
average yield, and only a fraction of the pol-
icies were sold at this level, it would take a
very risky yield to result in payments more
than even 25% of the time. Over a long period,
it should be statistically impossible to receive
payments on over half of the acres insured.
Spurlock et al. recently completed a study
using the USDA Risk Management Agency’s
Mississippi cotton and soybean APH records
for 1986–95. While these data are nonrandom,
they represent growers who purchase insur-
ance and have a long series of individual yield
records. The farm-level data were used, in
combination with county data, to develop
farm-level probability density functions
(PDFs). These PDFs were used to develop
breakeven insurance rates for different cover-
age levels. Finally, the subsidized rates that
would be charged to these farmers were com-
pared to the breakeven rates from the PDFs.
For nonirrigated cotton, the subsidized rate
was over three and one-half times the break-
even rate. Subsidized nonirrigated soybean
rates were two and one-half times the break-
even rate.
Spurlock et al. use these data to simulateSkees et al.: Revenue Insurance in the South 59
farm viability for a typical Mississippi farm.
They conclude: “Buy-up APH coverage re-
duces expected ending net worth without
greatly reducing the standard deviation of end-
ing net worth. Purchasing the highest level of
APH coverage actually increases the probabil-
ity of eventual insolvent y“ (p. 16). These are
not new findings (see Skees and Nutt for sim-
ilar findings). Other researchers also have
raised questions about the premium rates
charged to farmers in the South.
Why Might the South Be Different?
Before the rapid expansion of crop insurance
in the 1980s, crop insurance performance be-
tween the South and the rest of the U.S. was
roughly the same: participation rates, actuarial
performance, and premium rates were about
equal. Thus, a critical question must be an-
swered before we can move forward with ef-
fective revenue insurance in the South: Why
is southern experience with crop insurance so
different than in the rest of the U.S. since the
early 1980s? Many researchers agree that there
have been serious contract design problems
(as discussed below) that allowed for program
abuse in the South, prompting rate increases
during the 1980s and early 1990s.
More specifically, individual-coverage
APH policies were designed for the South us-
ing Agricultural Stabilization and Conserva-
tion Service (ASCS) program yields in estab-
lishing the guarantee for those producers who
did not report their own yields. This procedure
worked adequately for establishing individual
coverage in the Midwest, but not in the South.
This is because insurance is based on planted
acres, while ASCS yields are more closely re-
lated to harvested acre yields. In the North,
planted and harvested acres are nearly identi-
cal in most years. In the South, however, aban-
donment can be significant, and the use of
ASCS yields resulted in an overinflated initial
yield on frequently abandoned acreage. If cov-
erage is initially overestimated, large losses—
and higher premium rates—are likely. Cotton,
in particular, has experienced many such ex-
amples where farmers were assigned yield
guarantees at levels higher than warranted.
Soybeans in the South also suffered many
contract design problems. Producers who did
not report individual yields were assigned
yields that were pegged to ASCS corn yields.
Again, the yields offered to producers in the
South were overinflated, while the same pro-
cedure applied to establishing soybean yields
proved to be quite effective in the North.
In addition, the effects of irrigating soy-
beans in the South cannot be easily compared
with the rest of the U.S .—another difference
that was not recognized in the early years of
the APH program. Specifically, southern
growers could receive discounted rates for “ir-
rigated” soybeans based on principles from
the Midwest. Growers also were allowed to
prove yields on a few acres and then apply
those proven yields to new and, at times, more
marginal acres. The South is simply not as ho-
mogeneous as the Midwest. Thus, major dif-
ferences in farms and land suitability demand-
ed different rules for establishing insurable
yields. These lessons were hard to learn.
While improvements have been made to rec-
tify these problems, the history of losses due
to poor contract design is imbedded in existing
rates.
The South has other unique features that
have not been adequately considered as well.
Insect and disease problems are more preva-
lent in the South. Although farmers can ad-
dress insect and disease problems, it is nearly
impossible to anticipate how they will re-
spond. In effect, providing insurance against
insects and diseases largely insures manage-
ment, which invites both adverse selection and
moral hazard. It is impossible to insure man-
agement. Yet, to offer effective insurance in
the South, one must consider the extra cost
associated with trying to fight insects and dis-
eases. This situation may require a totally dif-
ferent policy than the present APH policy.
These issues relate not only to APH insurance,
but to revenue insurance in the South as well.
Ideas for the Future
Although the current revenue insurance pro-
grams have gained much attention recently,
other programs are also under investigation60 JoumalofAgricultu raland Applied Economics, July 1998
that may be attractive to producers in the
South. Currently, the USDA’s Risk Manage-
ment Agency is working on a revenue product
that would make payments to producers based
on their whole-farm income as reported on tax
forms (more specifically, the Schedule F).
Such an idea may be particularly attractive to
those who produce a wide variety of crops and
livestock. However, considerable care must be
taken to design a policy that cannot be abused.
The income stabilization account idea is
also tied to whole-farm income as reflected in
income tax forms, and has been in place in
Canada in the form of the Net Income Stabi-
lization Account concept since 1991. Under
this concept, each participating farmer would
have an interest-earning income stabilization
account. Farmers would be allowed to contrib-
ute a portion of their eligible net farm income
in good years and draw from this fund in bad
years. The Canadian government provides
matching funds up to a specified level, and a
premium on interest rates.
The American Farm Bureau and others
have expressed an interest in this type of pro-
gram in the past year, and some farmers have
raised issues regarding changes in tax policy
that could also provide income-averaging ben-
efits over time. While the program is attractive
in that it is based on whole-farm income and
does not favor any one crop or enterprise,
problems in implementing NISA are signifi-
cant. How does one monitor changes in farm
income? What checks and balances are in
place to prevent fraud? Who would be quali-
fied for the program? And will cash account-
ing still be allowed for filing taxes?
Finally, other strategies are emerging from
the private sector. Risk sharing can take many
forms. Contractual arrangements with input or
output firms and growers can and will have
features that mimic insurance. Commodities
that were once homogeneous are increasingly
differentiated with genetics. Firms supplying
genetically superior seed are finding new ways
of guaranteeing growers income. Input sup-
pliers are investigating weather event policies
to give growers the comfort to try their prod-
ucts. Agribusinesses who purchase raw prod-
ucts are increasingly aware of the importance
of giving growers opportunities to forward
price products. Combinations of contractual
arrangements, forward pricing, and traditional
crop insurance may prove superior to govern-
ment revenue insurance for some commodities
in the South.
Conclusions
Revenue insurance has the potential to provide
farmers with greater protection against low
revenues without increasing government costs
and without changing average levels of farm
income compared to the pre-1996 Farm Act
system of price supports, target prices, and de-
ficiency payments. Further, revenue insurance
offers the possibility for combining existing
price and yield guarantee programs into a sin-
gle program that may be easier to administer
and easier for farmers to use. As government
transfers to U.S. agriculture are reduced fur-
ther in the future, revenue insurance might
serve to lessen the decline in the safety net
provided for farmers’ incomes.
At the same time, revenue insurance raises
new questions about equitable treatment of
growers across crops and regions. At the pres-
ent, revenue insurance in the South is at a dis-
advantage relative to the Midwest. Currently,
the revenue insurance program that is most
widely available is CRC, which bases premi-
ums on APH rates. Prior bad history associ-
ated with the APH program in the South, and
the resulting high premium rates, make CRC
less attractive to southern growers. Until these
issues are addressed, or until programs such as
1P that do not use APH rates are more widely
available in the South, it is likely that the
southern region will be disadvantaged relative
to the Midwest. Nonetheless, no matter what
revenue insurance policies are tried in the
South, both the government and the private
sector are well advised to be cautious and to
recognize the differences in the South. Lear-
ningfrom the crop insurance experience is es-
sential before new revenue insurance products
developed with the Midwest in mind are tried
in the South.
Despite these challenges, however, the un-
derlying relationships between prices andSkees et al.: Revenue Insurance in the South 61
yields, as well as inherent levels of yield vari-
ability, suggest that revenue insurance could
bean attractive prospect in the South. Recent
research has examined the effectiveness of
various risk-management alternatives, includ-
ing revenue insurance, in reducing revenue
risk in various locations, including represen-
tative areas in the South. These results indicate
that producers who purchase revenue insur-
ance in areas of the South having relatively
high yield variability, and where the price-
yield correlation is relatively weak, should re-
alize substantially reduced income risk.
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